A Critique of the Legal and Philosophical Case for Rent Control

Rent control is an economic abomination. It diverts investments away from residential rent units, it leads to their deterioration, it is responsible for urban decay such as in the South Bronx, it does not help poor tenants, it is a horrendous means of income redistribution. Yet this economic regulation is beloved of intellectuals (hot beds of pro rent control sentiment are Berkeley, Ann Arbor and Cambridge) particularly in the legal and philosophical communities. The present article is dedicated to an exploration and rejection of the arguments in behalf of rent control which emanate from this source.     

美国空军卫星控制网的现状与发展趋势

近几年的几场局部战争部分表明了现代军事航天系统的重要性。本文主要介绍了美国最重要的一个军事航天测控网－－空军卫星控制网的情况，希望能对了解美国军事航天测控体制有所帮助。     

组织伦理气氛与道德行为关系的理论分析

组织伦理气氛作为组织文化的一部分,直接影响着道德行为的发生.文章介绍了组织伦理气氛的理论构建,提出从组织伦理气氛的种类和组织伦理气氛的强弱程度两个维度来阐述组织伦理气氛与道德行为的关系,指出不同种类的伦理气氛产生道德行为的可能性不同,不同的伦理气氛强弱程度对道德行为的影响程度也有所差异.最后,文章提供了强化和改进组织伦理气氛的几种方法.     

从知名企业的实践看内部控制在我国的应用

内部控制是企业加强经营管理的基本方式,它体现着现代企业经营管理的需求,有利于加强企业经营管理,达到公司治理、追求最大化利润的目的.联想和海尔两大集团的实践经历,是现代企业内部控制的应用方法以及操作模式的典范,为现代企业高级管理层以及财务总监提供了有益借鉴.     

油井水泥产品质量现状分析

结合2000～2005年对各油田油井水泥的质量监督工作，对我国油井水泥使用的标准、产品工艺、产品质量现状进行了分析。     

Duration and the price behavior of fixed-rate level payment mortgages: An analytical investigation

In this research we use a continuous payment formula for duration to examine the price behavior of a fixed-rate level payment mortgage. In the case where the mortgage is held to maturity, duration increases monotonically as term-to-maturity increases, regardless of changes in the market rate of interest. In the case where the mortgage is prepaid prior to maturity, there exists a unique market interest rate below which duration is a monotonically increasing function of time of prepayment, but above which duration has a global maximum at some time of prepayment prior to the term-to-maturity.     

Static and dynamic efficiency of pollution control strategies

A great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. Most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non-market instruments. According to several analytical studies, market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non-market instruments. In the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress. Empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking.The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The paper deals with an empirical estimation of abatement costs for the emission of SO₂ of coal-fired electricity units in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2000. First, the working of market instruments and non-market instruments (the existing environmental policy of the Dutch government) is simulated in a static situation. Second, we analyse the learning effects of flue gas desulphurization. The efficiency advantage of market instruments turns out to be larger in a situation of technological progress than in a static situation.     

公司财务控制机理:一个基于制度博弈的分析

财务控制的目标是对出资者和经营者之间形成的代理契约的冲突进行管理和协调.以出资者与经营者的制度博弈模型为分析基础,可以清楚表明财务控制机理特征:首先,财务控制本身具有的制度成本(控制成本)是制约控制成效的关键因素;其次,财务控制作为一种制度安排,应具备使经营者违背代理契约的外部成本内部化的功能;最后,财务控制本质是一种契约安排,是出资者和经营者之间多次动态博弈的结果,因此需要不断进行修正完善.     

Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion

We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques.